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ABSTRACT
The single most defining event in water and wastewater
privatization this decade is the advent of long-term
contracts. It has changed the economics, politics, and
policy of privatization in many fundamental ways. This
paper sketches out some of the most important changes
that we have observed so far, and derives some research
needed to better understand the full impact of long-term
privatizations.

operates, manages, and maintains it. Many contracts also
require the private firm to upgrade or expand facilities
and handle customer and other related services. Finally,
a review of contracts signed in the last few years shows
that almost without exception they are long-term
agreements3 (Public Works Financing, 1998). This trend
towards long-term privatization contracts is the main
thrust of this paper – but before we explore its
implications, we have to examine why it is.

INTRODUCTION
WHY PRIVATIZATION?
Privatization of water and wastewater facilities in the
United States is not a new phenomenon. Converting
government-owned facilities to private ownership or
management goes back at least three decades (Beecher, et
al., 1995). In the 1990s this has emerged as one of the
fastest growing areas of privatization at the local
government level. Hundreds of communities have hired
private firms to run all or part of their water or
wastewater systems each year for the last several years
(Public Works Financing, 1998). And according to a
recent survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, four out
of ten cities are actively considering privatization in order
to reduce costs and attract private capital investment1
(Larson, 1999).

A 1998 survey by R.W. Beck (1998) found that public
official’s greatest operational concern is meeting
environmental regulations. The picture the survey paints
of capital investment concerns is more complex. Public
officials report that capital improvements are driven by:
Growth
Age
Regulations
Other

40%
30%
27%
3%

Coping with economic growth and with aging facilities is
currently the greatest concern. But that may change.
Over the last two decades, through the Clean Water Act
and the Safe Drinking Water Act and their subsequent
amendments, standards governing the quality of drinking
water and cleanliness of effluent discharged into
waterways have become ever more stringent. To meet
these increasing standards, many local water and
wastewater systems require improved technologies and
upgraded infrastructure. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Association of Metropolitan Sewerage
Agencies (AMSA), Water Environment Foundation
(WEF), and others now estimate that $400 to $500 billion
in capital investments are needed to bring all water and
sewer systems into compliance (U.S. Environmental

Several clear trends emerged over these decades.2 First,
until recently, privatization of these facilities was a
small-town phenomenon. Only in the last few years have
large cities moved in this direction – culminating in
1998s privatization of the water system in Atlanta.
Second, with few exceptions, privatization of water and
wastewater facilities has not meant asset sales or leases –
almost all privatizations are contracts for operation and
maintenance (O&M) of facilities. Now and then some
small systems are sold or leased – for example Fairbanks,
Alaska, sold both utilities in 1997. With contract O&M,
the government still owns the facility, and a private firm
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Protection Agency, 1997; AMSA/WEF, 1999). Planned
federal and state funding will likely amount to less than
half of the need (Cook and Rosseel, 1997).

I think may have the most repercussions. Also, I am not
in a position to gather the data necessary to empirically
examine the issues I raise. My hope is that these
observations will encourage other to pursue such
empirical work.

Local governments who own these water and sewer
systems are having great difficulty financing these
improvements through conventional means of bonded
debt or increased user fees. Caps on borrowing or voter
resistance have made bond issues less viable and less
attractive to policy makers. 4 And it is the prospect of
increased fees that has increasingly made privatization an
attractive option. Atlanta is a dramatic illustration.

Economic
Perhaps the most important economic implication of
long-term contracts is also the simplest. A short term
O&M contract usually does not offer large enough total
dollar savings to cover capital investment needs. The
kind of operating and capital changes required to
generate 20 percent and greater operating cost savings
take time to implement. Long-term contracts allow both
sides to share and spread risks most appropriately and
efficiently, and implement a broader range of cost saving
measures.

The city water system was significantly out of compliance
with environmental standards, leading to fines levied by
the federal EPA. The water utility’s own estimate of the
cost to upgrade the system and achieve compliance called
for a more than 100 percent increase in water rates. After
a hotly contested competition among private firms, the
final arrangement cuts the cost of upgrading and
operating the utility by 44 percent, and means water rates
need increase less than 30 percent to pay for the upgrades
(Moore, 1999a).

Surveys of public officials and casual observation show
that the leading opponents of privatizations are the public
employee unions.5 That is not likely to change. However,
long-term contracts have dramatically changed the terms
available to public employees. It is increasingly common
for long-term O&M contracts to require that all
employees be hired by the winning bidder (save those
who cannot pass a drug test), and that the firm agree not
to lay off any of those employees for a set period (usually
at least one year) (Moore, 1999b). Again, Atlanta is a
good illustration – the city required full hiring, with no
layoffs for one year, and the winning bidder offered no
layoffs for the length of the contract (Moore, 1999a).

Privatization in order to improve environmental
compliance indicates that it is not cost savings alone, but
a strong element of quality concerns that drive
privatization decisions. Milwaukee provides a perfect
example. In early 1998 the city signed an agreement with
a private firm to operate the city wastewater treatment
system for 10 years (Larson, 1999). The agreement cut
the city’s annual operating costs by 30 percent, for
projected total savings of over $148 million. The contract
also contained many innovative provisions guaranteeing
employee jobs, benefits, and representation, and a series
of quality-based performance measures and bonuses. The
city in June 1999 announced that after one year, cost
savings allowed the city to cut user fees 15.5 percent, and
the private operator had exceeded most performance
goals, including:

Public employees make use of this trend, and if they fail
to stop a privatization from occurring in the first place,
their next demand is often for a full-hire provision. Even
more interestingly, private operating firms are not
opposing the idea, and even foster it, as in Atlanta. They
argue that it helps to reduce ill-will and makes transitions
much smoother, and that, in fact they have always on
average hired over half of existing employees for their
intimate knowledge of the local system (Moore, 1999b).
But, it is the long-term aspect of these new contracts that
allows full-hire provisions. Private operating firms tend
to operate water and sewer utilities with about two-thirds
the personnel that government does (Wall Street
Transcript, 1999). The natural turnover rate of
employees combined with some transfers of employees
within the firm can bring the total number of employees
down to the desired level (i.e. where the firm makes a
profit at the contract price they bid) in around 3-5 years.
So, for short-term contracts, full-hire provisions would
often mean no profits, and so are rarely seen. With
long-term contracts they are becoming the norm.

• Injuries fell 160 percent, grievances fell 33 percent,
and sick days fell 20 percent;
• Minority participation was 22 percent (exceeding the
contract’s 13 percent goal); and
• Compliance exceeded the DNR permits by 50 percent
(earning the firm a $50,000 bonus).

IMPLICATIONS OF
LONG -TERM
PRIVATIZATION
CONTRACTS
I don’t pretend to be able to point out all of the
implications of long-term O&M contracts. My goal is to
cover those that are most clearly emerging or those that
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Another labor issue is that of benefits after privatization.
Recent years have seen many private firms offer wages
that are converging on those employees earned from local
government, but benefit packages lagged. Notably,
private sector defined contribution pension plans were
viewed as inferior to public-sector defined benefit pension
plans. With the splendid performance of the stock
market in recent times, defined contribution plans have
begun to look more attractive. Also, private pension
plans often have much shorter vesting periods, and many
governments are converting to defined contribution
pensions, even the federal government. In instances
where pension remains a bone of contention, a new
possibility has emerged. When Milwaukee privatized its
sewer system in a 10-year agreement in late 1997, the
deal included a provision keeping the employees in the
city pension system after they transferred to the private
operator (Moore, 1999a). This required approval of a
waiver by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which was
secured, and now the firm makes pension payments to the
city on behalf of those employees. Many in industry
expect this provision to appear in some future contracts.
These developments have to some extent closed the gap
between private and government benefits packages.

The changes in the industry, and the direct effect of
long-term arrangements, have made bidding for contracts
more vigorous than ever. Long-term arrangements,
without the prospect of costly re-bids every few years, are
much more attractive to the industry. And local
governments strive to squeeze from the bidding process
for a 20-year contract at least all of the cost savings that
would be expected from 20 years of a periodically
competitive contract. Casual empiricism to date indicates
that average annual cost savings from long-term contracts
are greater than average savings from short-term ones.
This probably reflects a combination of the savings from
competition being realized on a larger scale for longer
contacts, and the industry’s contention that more
efficiency can be realized over a longer period.

Political
The politics of long-term privatization are largely a
function of the economics. On one hand, public officials
often cite concerns about loss of control behind their
resistance to privatization. Long-term privatization only
exacerbates that concern.6 On the other hand, there is a
growing realization that the higher user fees caused by
extensive capital improvements have very regressive
effects on local residents. This is starting to cause the
politics of privatization to deviate from conventional
thought.
As Atlanta’s liberal mayor showed,
conservatives do not own privatization as a policy. His
core constituency, the urban poor, stood to lose the most
from the expected 100 percent increase in rates if the
public works department continued to operate the water
system. Of course, these issues are most salient in larger
cities. The total dollar figures in smaller cities, while
perhaps representing as significant a share of the local
government budget, do not incite the passions that the
nine-digit figures of big cities do.

A darker development arising from long-term contracts
raises the question of inter-generational equity. Some
contracts included large concession fees, paid by the
contractor to the local government, that represent some
portion of the present-discounted value of future
operating cost savings. Another way to describe them is
as the discounted present value of future user fee
increases (or lack of decrease made possible by future
operating efficiencies). However stated, the practice
means that future ratepayers will pay higher rates than
they might otherwise have to as a result of current
policy-maker’s desire for a pot of unencumbered dollars
to spend as they will. Even if that money is used in an
actuarially wise fashion such as for infrastructure, there
may be considerable deadweight loss during the transfer.

The change in options for employees has also changed
the politics of privatization.
Fiscally responsible
democrats and public employees are more likely to
compromise with privatization proposals that protect
their security to a greater degree than in the past (Gillen
and Johnson, 1999).

Finally, the advent of long-term contracts appears to be
causing changes within the operator industry. While
most of the market was small towns and short-term
contracts, investment in the U.S. market by the large
international water firms, especially the French firms,
remained somnolent. But recent years have seen them
enter the U.S. with much fanfare and lots of capital. At
the same time, there has been some consolidation within
existing firms, and entry by a number of new firms –
mostly subsidiaries of investor-owned water utilities or
electric power firms, such as Enron and Duquesne
Energy.

Finally, some of the recent long-term contracts in bigger
cities, again notably Atlanta, have been laden with
unrelated “community benefit” requirements. Contracts
have long included minority participation requirements,
but stratagems as diverse as corporate office relocations
and school programs have begun to appear in bid
proposals. The firms including such provisions argue
that they give the elected officials involved some concrete
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benefits to offer those who are not persuaded by the
economics of the privatization itself. But some observers
remain concerned about the politicization of economic
decisions and a loss of focus on the core performance
elements of the contract, which, with a long-term
agreement, could have serious repercussions.

CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH NEEDS
The single most defining event in water and wastewater
privatization this decade is the advent of long-term
contracts. It has changed the economics, politics, and
policy of privatization in many fundamental ways. And
it is still only two years old, so much remains to be
learned – we really don’t know the full extent of the
changes it has wrought and is yet to bring. This paper
sketched out some of the most important changes that we
have observed so far, and hinted at some to come. If
nothing else, the much larger dollar size of long-term
contracts, made even larger in the case of large cities
attracted to privatization by the prospect of long-term
arrangements, changes the economic impact of
privatization considerably. From that follows political
changes in labor impacts and policy changes in
contracting practices. It is hard to doubt that we will see
more change as long-term privatization practices mature.

Policy
Given the economic and political attractions of long-term
privatization, there is little doubt that some local
governments who chose long-term O&M contracts would
choose an asset lease or sale if it were not for perverse tax
rules. Under current rules, if a local government sells or
leases its water utility to a private party, the debt on the
facility is no longer tax exempt, raising the cost of capital
by about four percent. This despite the fact that the utility
will continue to serve the same public purpose, serve the
same customers, still have government regulation of its
rates, and will begin to pay income, property, and sales
taxes from which it was previously exempt. That four
percent differential makes contract O&M the more
attractive option in most cases, even if leaving it aside
would mean a sale or lease was more efficient and
desirable. There is an argument to be made that there
would be net fiscal and efficiency gains from changing
the tax rules so that entities serving a well-defined public
purpose, and not just publicly-owned entities, have access
to tax-exempt debt (Gillen and Johnson, 1999).

But already we can identify some key research needs. To
name but a few:
• Does the prior assumption of industry and policy
makers that private firms can effectively operate
utilities with roughly two-thirds the number of
employees hold up in the long run? How do
“equilibrium” manning levels compare after 10 or 15
years? Ultimately, what percentage of the total cost
savings of privatization derive from these labor
productivity gains, and how much from capital
improvements?
• Are the cost savings and quality improvements agreed
to in long-term contracts sustained, eroded, or
increased over the length of the contract? Does the
principal-agent problem overwhelm competition for
longer-term contracts?
• Do long-term contracts increase the rents created by
privatization relative to short-term contracts? Do they
decrease their transaction costs? Both hypotheses
seem plausible but the questions are complex in detail.
• As long-term contracts become more prevalent, will
competition for them increase, continue, or decrease?
How will the industry change?
• Are there measurable net economic effects good or
bad, from the dominance of contract O&M over asset
sales and leases?

Long-term privatizations also challenge the fundamentals
of a growing policy practice – managed competitions. A
managed competition is one in which the in-house
employees are allowed to bid against private firms for the
contract. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1997)
Since a significant share of the cost savings from
long-term privatization come from shifting risks to the
private operators, it is very difficult for an in-house team
to offer competitive bids. To date, no long-term contracts
have been bid as managed competitions. This may turn
out to be a non-problem, since much of the reason for
managed competitions is to assuage public employee
unions objections to privatization, and long-term
contracts offer full-hire provisions in its place.
By stirring increased interest in privatization, long-term
contracts are increasing attention to legal barriers to
privatization of utilities. Many states have their own laws
that restrict long-term privatization or require them to be
approved on a case-by-case basis. And the EPA has
administratively decided that E.O. 12803 requires it to
closely examine all long-term privatizations. Local
governments are mobilizing to secure state and federal
legislation to alleviate these barriers. 7
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negotiation in the last few years, 67 are long-term
contracts proposed since January 1997.

This in spite of the consistent data showing that only a
small minority of public employees get laid off due to
privatization (Larson 1999).
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The financial picture is only going to get more complex.
In June 1999 the Government Accounting Standards
Board issued a new financial reporting model for all state
and local government entities. The new model requires
full accrual accounting, among many other changes, and
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Likely effects of the changes are operating deficits for
many cities, coupled with greater difficulty in deferring
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privatization to either reduce operating costs or to
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initiatives by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and by
recent work on model legislation by the American
Legislative Exchange Council.
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